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RECENT CASES
BANKS AND BANKING--CHECK COLLECTIONS-EFFECT OF AGREEMENT
WITH CUSTOMER PERMITTING ACCEPTANCE OF DRAFTS ON DRAWEE AS CONDI-

PAYMENT-Plaintiff deposited check with customer bank under an agreement I permitting the bank to forward items for collection directly to any bank,
including the drawee, and "to accept drafts of such banks (but only subject to
payment) as conditional payment in lieu of cash". Customer bank forwarded the
check to collecting bank which surrendered it to drawee upon receiving drawee's
draft on another bank. Before collecting bank could realize on the draft the drawee
bank was closed for liquidation and the draft dishonored. Held (reversing court
below), that collecting bank having acted negligently in giving up customer's check
before payment was completed, plaintiff was entitled to recover from the collecting
TIONAL

bank under the "Massachusetts" rule.2
Co. et al., 144 Co. 858 (Miss. 1932).

People's Gin Co. v. Canal Bank & Trust

In collection cases the customer bank, under the "New York" rule, is liable
to its depositors for all defaults in the collection process.3 Under the "Massachusetts" rule, however, it is liable only for its own negligence and its correspondents
are liable directly to the depositor.4 One of the outstanding bases for liability
under either rule has been a failure to observe the requirement of receipt of proceeds in cash only.' This rule has been attacked as being at variance with modem
banking methods.6 In several states it has been overruled by judicial recognition
of banking custom.7 In a number of others it has been abrogated by statutes
and in still others the banks have endeavored to avoid it by stipulations contained
on the signature cards or deposit slipsY The provision in the instant case is
greatly similar to that evolved by counsel for the American Banker's Association ' 0 and in at least one instance such an agreement has been held to relieve the
Contained on plaintiff's signature card.
The court sent the case back to determine the rights of the collecting bank against the
customer bank, raised by a cross-bill filed by collecting bank.
'St. Nicholas Bank v. State Nat. Bank, 128 N. Y. 26, 27 N. E. 849 (i8gi); Harter Y.
Bank of Brunson, 92 S. C. 440, 75 S. E. 696 (1912). The rule is based on the theory that
the bank will undertake the collection by methods of its own selection, generally by the appointment of sub-agents.
"Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U. S. 16o (1924) ; I MoRsE, BANKS AND BANIKING (6th ed. 1928) § 275. This rule is based on the theory that correspondents are essential
to collection and that the customer, therefore, impliedly authorizes their selection.
The collecting agent is presumed to lack authority to accept anything not legal tender
in payment of his principal's debt. See I MECHEm, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 946. Nor does
permission to forward items directly impliedly authorize acceptance of payment by draft:
Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, supra note 4.
1 See Turner, Bank Collections-The Direct Routing Practice (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 468,
483.
, Cattaruzza v. First Nat. Bank, io6 W. Va. 458, 146 S. E. 393 (1928) ; United States
F. & G. Co. v. Forest County State Bank, 199 Wis. 56o, 227 N. W. 27 (1929).
' Prior to the drafting of the Bank Collection Code the following states permitted the
acceptance of remittance drafts in lieu of currency by statute: Cal. Stats. 1925, c. 312, § 5;
Colo. Laws I923, c. 64; Mont. Laws 1925, c. 65; Ore. Laws 192o, § 6217; S. C. Acts 1927,
No. 2o2; S. D. Laws 1921, c. 31; Tenn. Acts 1921, c. 37.
' Pierson, Legislation Relating to Problens of Check Collection (1928) 14 A. B. A. J.
406, 408; Note (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 687; Bogert, Failed Banks, Collection Items and
Trust Preferences (1931) 29 Micr. L. R-v. 545, 558.
10By Thomas Paton (see 2 PATON, DIrcsT (1926) § I446a), which reads in part: "This
bank or its correspondents may send items, directly or indirectly, to any bank, including the
payor, and accept its draft or credit as conditional payment in lieu of cash ..
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collecting bank of liability to the depositor." In the present case the court reached
a contrary result by construing strictly the agreement between the bank and the
customer, holding that the words "conditional payment" made it negligence to give
up the customer's check before receiving payment in full. While this construction seems rather forced, it is believed that the result-placing the responsibility
for accepting other than cash upon the collecting bank-is commendable. The
Bank Collection Code, which has been enacted in some eighteen jurisdictions,
including Pennsylvania, 2 adopts a contrary ruleY3 The Uniform Bank Collection Act,' 4 however, holds the collecting bank responsible upon the theory that it
"is usually in position to demand payment in manner satisfactory to it".15

BoNDs--GoLD CLAUsE-RIGHT TO PAYMENT IN GOLD COIN AND AMOUNT
SUCH PAYMENT-Defendant, a Belgian company, issued bearer bonds
through a London issuing house, which bonds were specifically to be governed
by English law. A summons was taken out by plaintiff, a holder of one of them,
to determine the construction of the instrument in regard to its payment. Across
the middle of the document in bold type was "Bond for One Hundred pounds",
while in each comer, and superimposed upon the small lettering was " [oo."
However, in the initial paragraph, payment was promised of "the sum of £ioo in
sterling in gold coin of the United Kingdom of or equal to the standard of weight
and fineness existing on the first day of September 1928." One of the conditions on the back was liability in gold coin. Held, that the bond was to secure
payment of £Ioo, not the value of the defined gold; nor was the payment in
gold coin required, being unenforceable under the Coinage Act of i87o.1 Re
Socift Intercommunale Beige d'Electricit, Feist v. The Company, High Court
of Justice, Chancery Division, October 27, 1932.
The court was faced with the dilemma of two mutually exclusive constructions: a) that the instrument promised £ioo when due, thereby giving effect to
the large type and the many figures; b) that the promise was to pay the sum, in
currency or coin, necessary when due to buy the quantity of gold of the value of
£ioo in 1928 (an amount at present much more than £ioo). To adopt the
latter construction would make the sum payable unascertained until the date of
payment, and in consideration thereof the court adopted the former construction.
In addition, it was ruled that payment could not be enforced in gold coin. Since
it was a general debt, a debtor could not be forced to pay in any particular form
of legal tender. There was apparently no precedent in England upon any phase
of the case 2 but the latter problem of form of payment is not a new one in the
3
United States. Subsequent to the Legal Tender Act, many states held that a
OF

E. S. Macomber Co. v. Commercial Bank, 166 S. C. 236, 164 S.E. 596 (1932).
Pa. Bank Collection Act (I931) P. L. 568. See Legislation (1932) 81 U. or PA. L.
REv. 2oi.
I

Section 9.

u HANDBOOK

OF TEE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM

LAwS AND PROCEEDINGS (931)

256,

§ 39. (No changes were made at the

STATE

1932 Conference.)

" The comment continues: "The clearing house may check up on any member in weak
condition and if need be require security to cover settlement drafts. The case is not like the
mail remittance situation where no other practicable way is available, except to remit in exchange."

IO (1870).
The only case mentioned by the court was the decision of the World Court in the Case
Concerning the Payment in Gold of Brazilian Federal Loans Issued in France, (1929) Fifth
Annual Report of the Permanent Court of International Justice 216; and their conclusion
followed.
was not
12 STAT. 345, 532 (1862) ; cf. 31 U. S. C. A. (1927) 451 et seq.
133 and 34 VIcT. c.
2
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specific requirement of gold coin or the like was unenforceable, 4 but the Supreme
Court decision in Bronson v. Rodes,5 giving effect to such a clause, settled the
question. 6 This interpretation was correct as a question of statutory construction, but the almost universal abandonment of the gold standard creates a new
aspect. The English court in the instant case, unfettered by precedent and the
rule of stare decisis, had little difficulty in arriving at a result justified by present
economic stress. An American court will undoubtedly reach a similar conclusion, when the question arises,7 although over more barriers. Not only is there
a contrary decision by the highest court of the land, but if that case is substantially reversed, an interpretation of the Legal Tender Acts, limiting the freedom
of contract, must be found constitutional." It is right that in a changing world
the law should change relatively to serve best the interests of society; 9 but it
will be interesting to learn the form of words by which American courts will
achieve the conclusion of the instant case.

OF NOTARY TO
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONTEMPT-NOTARIES--POWER
COMMIT WITNESS FOR REFUSAL TO TESTIFY BY DEPOSITION BEFORE HIM AS

Ohio statute which provided for the taking of
depositions before a notary granted to him the powers of subpoena, and of fining
VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROocEss-An

or committing for contempt witnesses who failed to appear or answer questions
properly put.1 The witness was accorded the opportunity of an immediate judicial
review of the commitment.2 The plaintiff was remanded to the custody of the
defendant sheriff in accordance with the above procedure and on the commitment
being affirmed seeks on this appeal to have the sections of the statute applicable
declared unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Held, that the
statute was constitutional. Ex Parte Bevan, 184 N. E. 393 (Ohio 1933).
The exact nature of the notarial power to take depositions as granted by
statutes of this type is in dispute. Some cases, in view of the power of subpoena,
the duty to rule on questions of evidence, and the purported grant of power to
commit for contempt,3 treat the power as judicial. 4 Other jurisdictions have felt
'Whetstone v. Colley, 36 Ill. 328 (1865) ; Thayer v. Hedges, 23 Ind. 141 (1864) ; Ritey
v. Sharp, I Bush 348 (Ky. 1866) ; Appel v. Woltmann, 38 Mo. 194 (186o) ; Laughlin v. Harvey, 52 Pa. 9 (1866).
57 Wall. 229 (U. S. 1869).
"Bronson v. Rodes, supra note 5, was followed in: Butler v. Horwitz, 7 Wall. 258
(1869) ; Bronson v. Kimpton, 8 Wall. 444 (1869) ; Trebilock v. Wilson, 12 Wall. 687 (1872) ;
Munter v. Rogers, 5o Ala. 283 (1873) ; McGoon v. Shirk, 54 Ill. 4o8 (187o) ; Chrysler v.
Renois, 43 N. Y. 209 (187o).

"The desertion of the gold standard as well as the fact that all gold has been collected by
the United States Government makes a judicial controversy inevitable. Where the latter is
involved, impossibility of performance would seem a defense, but would damages be the value
of that amount of gold or merely the stated amount in other legal tender?
' See Johnson, CostituttionalLimitations and the Gold Standard (933) 67 U. S. L. REV.
187.

. Cf. Cardozo, The Paradoxesof Legal Scienwe (1928) 14-15.
'OHIO GEN. Conm (Throckmorton, 193o) §§ 11510-11512.
Oio GEN. CODE (Throckmorton, 193o) § 11514.

'This power is purely statutory and was clearly non-existent at common law. Burtt v.
Pyle, 89 Ind. 398 (1883) ; Johnson v. State, 54 Tex. Crim. App. 113, 111 S. W. 743 (19o8).
But if the notary cited the witness to the commissioning court, it would often hold him in
contempt of its mandate. See JoHN, AmmiAN NoTARIEs (3d ed. 1922) 20o and cases there
cited.
' People ex rel. McDonald v. Leubischer, 34 App. Div. 577, 54 N. Y. Supp. 869 (1898);
Noell v. Bender, 317 Mo. 392, 295 S. W. 532 (1927). "Judicial" as used here is used merely
in the sense used in constitutional provisions vesting "judicial" power in certain bodies.

RECENT CASES

997

that his functions were ministerial or administrative.5 In the states where the
functions are considered judicial, the constitutionality of the statute creating them
depends upon the particular provisions in the local constitution controlling the
exercise of judicial functions." But where the notary is considered as acting not
judicially in committing recalcitrant witnesses, a new problem of constitutionality
arises under the Fourteenth Amendment. The notary's power is analogous to
that of administrative officers who are permitted to summarily deprive citizens of
property rights in the course of their duty. It is generally held that such deprivations are by due process of law if a hearing before an appropriate tribunal is provided at any time, even subsequent to the deprivation,7 and even if the hearing
takes the form of a collateral attack on the administrative officer's judgment.8
Such requirement is fulfilled in the principal case by the statutory provision for
judicial review. However, it is possible that the federal courts, when called upon
to pass on the matter,9 will distinguish between a deprivation of property for
which damages will compensate adequately, and a deprivation of personal freedom. The convenience and utility of depositions, however, and the necessity for
a strong sanction to prevent the collapse of the entire device would seem to militate against such a distinction being made.' 0

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-THE JUSTIFYING OF ACTS
OF VIOLENCE AS CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM-The defendant, speaking only to a

governmental official and one other person, boasted that if given an opportunity
he would destroy an airship upon which he was working. For this statement, he
was indicted under an Ohio statute ' for justifying crime, sabotage or violence as
a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform. The lower court, holding
the statute unconstitutional, sustained a demurrer to the indictment, and the
prosecutor, by statutory procedure,2 appealed to determine the validity of the
5

Re Huron, 58 Kan. I52, 48 Pac. 574 (1897) ; De Camp v. Archibold, 50 Ohio St. 618,

35 N. E. 1O56 (1893).

' The powers of judicial bodies to commit for contempt is recognized as due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County, 134 U. S. 39, IO Sup. Ct.
424 (x8go) ; Rothschild v. Steiger Piano Mfg. Co., 256 Ill. 196, 99 N. E. 92o (1912). As to
the effect of local constitutions see Re Huron, supra note 5 (held the delegation of judicial
power was improper).
7People ex rel. Copcutt v. Board of Health, 14o N. Y. I, 35 N. E. 320 (i893) ; Salem

v. Eastern
R. Co., 98 Mass. 431 (i868).
8

Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 250 U. S. 363, 39 Sup. Ct. 513 (919)
(proceeding in equity necessary to provide hearing).
' The Fourteenth Amendment was brought into view only in the two cases cited supra

note 5 and never in a federal court.
"

This idea seems to have motivated the court in In rc Abeles, 12 Kan. 451 (1874).

'Oio GEN. CODE (Page, 1931) §§ 13421-23, 13421-24, the latter of which states: "Any
person who . . . openly, wilfully, and deliberately justifies, by word of mouth or writing,
the commission or the attempt to commit crime, sabotage, violence or, unlawful means of
terrorism with intent to exemplify, spread or advocate the propriety of the doctrines of
criminal syndicalism . . . is guilty of a felony. .. ."
6 OEio GEN. CODE (Page, 193)
§ 13446-4 providing that the appellate decision "shall not
affect the judgment of the court of common pleas" which released the defendant, but only
"shall determine the law to govern in a similar case". The majority of the court, in broad
generalities, delivered what was essentially an advisory opinion, refused to consider the case
on its particular facts, and failed to answer the contention of the dissent that in its condemnation of mere justification of violence the statute was invalid. If we consider the ,factual
dependence of most constitutional decisions, the juridical tradition of confining cases to issues
born of the specific facts, and the necessity of factual precision in effectively establishing
rules to guide lower courts, and the attendant danger of indefiniteness, the view here taken
by the court would seem to be unfortunate. See Frankfurter, Note on Advisory Opinions
(924) 37 H~Av. L. REv. ioo2.
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law. Held (two justices dissenting), that the statute was a constitutional exercise
of the police power. State v. Kassay, 184 N. E. 521 (Ohio 1933).
The important problem here involved is whether the statute denied the freedom
of speech that is protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 3 A distinction has been made in criminal
syndicalism statutes between those that prohibit acts involving the probability of,
and intended to effect, specific substantive evils,4 and those that condemn merely
the teaching of the doctrine of reform through revolution because of the inherent
danger to public interests.5 To the first, the courts applied the now classic test
that freedom of speech will only be denied when the words 6create a "dear and
present danger" of the commission of the substantive evils. As to the second
type, however, the Supreme Court has declared that if in the judgment of the
legislature the mere advocacy of a doctrine in a certain manner is inimical to
public interests, this conclusion is binding upon the Court whose only function
then is to determine whether the defendant advocated the condemned doctrine in
the prohibited manner.7 The persistent opposition to this view by members of
the Supreme Court,8 the logical implication that, as to freedom of speech, it
removes from the states the restraints of the due process clause, and the unsatisfactory result it would produce in cases like the instant one, are persuasive of its
unsoundness. If the purpose of criminal syndicalism statutes is to prevent violence and crime, it is difficult, in the light of American tradition, to appreciate the
propriety of a law which makes criminal a justification without incitement,9 and
which would permit prosecutions not only for condonement of past violence, but
as well for a condonement coupled with admonitions that future violence would
be inexpedient. Fortunately, the Supreme Court has more recently retreated
from its dubious position, and has considered whether there is any reasonable and
0
proper connection between the acts condemned and the danger of violence."
Thus, where the displaying of a red flag was declared illegal, the court pointed
out that such act did not create a probability of violence, although the legislature
'It is included in the concept of "liberty". Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 45 Sup.
Ct. 625 (1925) ; see Note (1927) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 198. The more narrow protection of
freedom of speech in Ohio Constitution, art. i, § ii, also applies, and the court admitted the
persuasiveness of decisions under the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Cf.
Note (1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 525, 528.

' Such as the Espionage Act, 40 STAT. 219 (1917), 50 U. S. C. § 33 (1926), which was
designed to prevent the substantive evils of insubordination, disloyalty, and resistance to the
draft. See Debs v. United States, 249 U. S. 217, 39 Sup. Ct. 252 (igig); Abrams v. United
States, 25o U. S. 616, 40 Sup. Ct. 17 (1919).
5

This type, like that in the instant case, supra note i, which is similar to IDAHO CoMP.
§ 14-3, 112, is quite prevalent.
(930)
402-405; Note (920) 20 CoL L. REv. 232.

STAT. (7919) § 858i, 3 and ORE. CODE ANN.
CHAFEE, FR

EDOM

OF SPEECH (1920)

See

Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247 (1919).

Gitlow v. New York, supra note 3, at 670, 45 Sup. Ct. at 631. The rule was applied in
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, 47 Sup. Ct. 655 (1926), in which the Court merely determined
whether the defendant had violated the statute. Cf. Burns v. United States, 274 U. S. 328, 47
Sup. Ct. 65o (1926).
8 Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., consistently maintained, ever since its establishment in the
Schenck Case, supra note 6, the proposition that freedom of speech is limited only when the
words create a probability of violence, sabotage or crime. Of especial interest is their dissent in the Gitlow case, supra note 3, and their concurrence in Whitney v. California, 274
U. S. 357, 47 Sup. Ct. 647 (1926), in which they looked to the emergency nature of the
statute. For other criticism in accord see Note (7928) 41 HAv. L. REv. 525, 528; CHAFM,
FRmom oF SPEECH (i920) 187-794.

I The dissent in the instant case points out, at pp. 528-529, that the broad terms of the
statute would permit prosecutions for justifications of the American Revolution.
Whitney v. California, supra note 8, in which the Court considers, at pp. 371, 372, 47
Sup. Ct. at 646, 647, whether mere membership in a society advocating violence creates a
greater likelihood of violence.
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apparently thought that it did. 1 Even under a rule as conservative as this, a
narrow concept of freedom of speech would demand that the broad, inappropriate
provisions of the statute in the instant case be declared unconstitutional.

CORPORATIONS-ULTRA VIRES CONTRACTS-IMPROPRIETY OF BANKING
CORPORATION'S AcQUISITION OF SHARES AS DEFENSE TO BREACH OF AGREEMENT
FOR THEIR PuRcHAsE-Plaintiff sued defendant banking corporation for breach

of an agreement to purchase certain shares. A Pennsylvania statute ' provided
that any corporation may purchase shares of any other corporation. Defendant
bank failed to plead that such transaction was ultra vires. Held, that the statute
was not applicable to banking corporations; that therefore the contract was ultra
vires and utterly void; that failure to plead it was no waiver of such defense.
Dillon, Read & Co. v. Commercial State Bank, 62 F. (2d) 606 (C. C. A. 3d,
1932).

Although it has been frequently enunciated as the federal rule that ultra vires
contracts, not fully executed, are "void" and not merely "voidable", 2 an examination of the federal decisions fails to substantiate this statement of the rule.3 In
certain situations,- effect has been given to transactions that were said to be ultra
vires, even though the court at the same time admitted the existence of the doctrine. It would therefore seem more expedient simply to determine whether or not
some legal effect shall be given to a particular transaction. If a sufficiently analogous situation has previously been adjudicated, the case before the court should
be controlled thereby under the principle of stare decisis; but it seems legally
unsound to formulate a general rule, predicated upon one factual situation, and
permit it to govern other vastly dissimilar situations. The cases relied upon by
the court to sustain the proposition that ultra vires contracts are void, involve
elements entirely foreign to the instant case. In those cases and in others where
no effect was given to the transaction, the important considerations were that the
transaction was contrary to "public policy" in that a "quasi-public" corporation
had attempted to transfer to others the rights and powers it had been given under
its franchise;r or that the particular act was prohibited by statute. 6 The instant
Stromberg v. United States, 283 U. S.359, 51 Sup. Ct. 532 (1930).

'PA. STAT.

ANN.

(Purdon,

193o) tit.

15, § 661.

'See Central Transportation Company v. Pullman's Palace Car Company, 139 U. S.24,
59, 1' Sup. Ct. 478, 488 (18g1) ; BALLANTINE. PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1927) 258; 7 FLETCHER, CY&c.oiEDiA CORPORATIONS (931) § 3468.
1 See Carpenter, Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires Be Discarded? (923) 33 YALE

L. J.49, 52.
' Purportedly ultra vires contracts were given effect in the following cases: Salt Lake
City v. Hollister, 118 U. S.256, 6 Sup. Ct. 1055 (1886) (a tax levied on business said to be
utra zires the corporation was sustained) ; Kerfoot v. Farmers' and Merchants' Bank, 218
U. S.281, 31 Sup. Ct. 14 (91o)
(the corporation had been a conduit of title acquired in an
ultra vires transaction) ; Citizens' Central National Bank v. Appleton, 216 U. S. 196, 30 Sup.
Ct. 364 (191o) (the corporation had received the benefits of the transaction).
I Central Transportation Company v. Pullman Palace Car Co., supra note 2; Thomas v.
Railroad Company, Io U. S.71 (1879); The York & Maryland Line Railroad Company v.
Winans, 17 How. 30 (1854) ; Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. St. Louis, Alton & Terre
Haute Railroad Company, 118 U. S.290, 6 Sup. Ct. 1094 (1886). In these cases the corporations (railroad companies) had given long-time leases of their railroad, rolling stock and
franchises. "Where a corporation, like a railroad company, has granted to it by charter a
franchise intended in a large measure to be exercised for the public good, the due performance of those functions being the consideration of the public grant, any contract which disables the corporation from performing those functions, which undertakes, without consent of
the State, to transfer to others the rights and powers conferred by the charter, and to relieve
the grantees of the burden which it imposes, is a violation of the contract with the State, and
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case presented none of the above elements: while a bank might be regarded as
"quasi-public", the transaction did not involve a transfer of its charter rights.
The mere purchase of shares cannot be said to be contrary to public policy; nor
was it prohibited by statute. The court was therefore free to be guided by the
equities of the case, and it is unfortunate that it did not scrutinize them more
closely. Thus, though it is true the defendant bank did not receive any benefits
from the transaction, nevertheless the plaintiff suffered great loss by relying upon
the contract and refraining from selling the shares to other possible purchasers
at the then market price.

COURTS--CRIMINAL CONTEMPT BY JURoR-EvIDENcE-Loss OF JUROR'S
PRIVILEGE UPON FALSE STATEMENTS AS TO LAcK OF BiAs-Defendant, a member
of a jury panel, upon voir dire examination as to qualifications for service stated

that she was unbiased, intentionally concealing the fact of her former employment
by corporation of which parties to the case had been officers. Held, that such concealment and misstatement was punishable as a criminal contempt. Clark v.
United States, 53 Sup. Ct. 465 (1933)
Inasmuch as the purpose of the voir dire examination of a prospective juror
as to his qualifications is to determine whether cause for challenge exists or
whether it is advisable to exercise the right of peremptory challenge,' it is apparent
that a prospective juror who makes false or deceptive answers as to a material
matter, such as lack of bias, is guilty of criminal contempt for obstructing the
court in the performance of its duty.2 The court in the instant case found little
difficulty in so holding. The interesting feature of the case, however, rests in
the court's treatment of the point which constituted the principal reason for
appeal. The trial court had admitted in evidence testimony as to statements made
urged that this was a violation of
by defendant while in the jury room.3 It was
4
the rule that such statements are privileged. It was pointed out that the principle
is based upon sound public policy since only by the assurance of absolute secrecy
which is so essential
can the complete ease and freedom of discussion be secured
5
to the securing of final unanimity among the jurors. It should be noted here
that this reasoning is generally relied on as the basis for refusing to allow a juror
is void as against public policy." Thomas v. Railroad Company, supra at 83. See also

TAYLOR,

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1902) 131, 132; 2 MORAWErz, PRIVATE COPORATIONS (2d ed.
1886) 1129. In this latter work it is said that ". . . whenever the aid of the government is

granted to a private company in the form of a monopoly, or a donation of public property or
funds, or a delegation of the power of eminent domain, the grant is subject to an implied condition that the company shall assume an obligation to fulfil the public purpose on account of
which the grant was made. . . . Any act of the company which would disable it from performing its duties to the public would be prohibited by law."
6Weber et al. v. Spokane Nat'l Bank et al., 5o Fed. 735 (C. C. D. Wash. 1892).
'Pearcy v. Michigan Mut. Life Ins. Co., II Ind. 59 (1886) ; I THoMPsoN, TRIALS (2d
ed. 1912) § iOI; ABBOTT, BaIEF FOR THE TIALiu OF CIVIL ISSUES (2d ed. 1900) § 52.

1In re NUNNS, 188 App. Div. 424, 176 N. Y. Supp. 858 (1919). "An obstruction to the
performance of judicial duty resulting from an act done in the presence of the court is . . .
the characteristic upon which the power to punish for contempt must rest." White, C. J., in
Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378, 383, 39 Sup. Ct. 337, 339 (1918).
3 The statements were admitted as bearing upon the state of mind of the defendant at the
time she was examined, United States v. Clark, I Fed. Supp. 747, 750 (D. Minn. 1931).
' Hewett v. Chapman, 49 Mich. 4 (1882); 5 WIGmORE, EvIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2346;
HUGHES, EVmFNCE (1907) 301. The court, in its opinion in the instant case, at 470, points
out that while this rule is quite generally accepted, it is largely based upon dicta in the adjudicated cases, which are significant because they bear with them the implication of an immemorial tradition.
'M'Kain v. Love, 2 Hill 5o6 (S. C. 1834) ; 5 WIGmORE, loc. cit. supra note 4.
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to impeach his own verdict 6 The very fact, however, that the rule of privilege
is based upon grounds of public policy indicates that it is not beyond the7reach of
a higher, conflicting policy which may be involved in a given situation. In the
instant case it is undeniable that it was just as essential that the jury's proceedings
should be free from fraud and corruption as that they should be 8privileged.
Therefore, while the court could have ignored appellant's contention, it should
be commended for its enunciation of what is an altogether proper limitation on
the rule of privilege, that upon a prima facie showing ' that a juror attained his
position through fraud or fraudulently continued it, the privilege should be withdrawn.

CRIMINAL LAw-ENTRAPMENT AS A DEFENSE-DEFENSE DENIED WHERE
DEFENDANT HAD HABITUALLY ENGAGED IN "MORALLY INDISTINGUISHABLE

CoNDucT"-For the purpose of securing evidence of defendant's violation of a
federal statute forbidding the shipment of obscene matter in interstate commerce,
postal inspectors induced A, a local customer of the defendant, to give the defendant an order purporting to come from B calling for the shipment of obscene
materials to B in a foreign state. A told the defendant that B was his customer.
B was in fact a post-office inspector. The defendant shipped the goods. Although
he was admittedly engaged in the local sale of obscene literature it was not shown
that he had ever previously shipped such materials across state lines. The
defendant pleaded "entrapment". Held, that the defense of "entrapment" is not
available to one "already engaged in conduct morally indistinguishable" from the
act with which one is charged. United States v. Becker, 62 F. (2d) 1007 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1933).
The essence of the defense of "entrapment" is that the crime originated in
the mind of a public officer who induced its commission by one who would not
otherwise have so acted.1 This defense, although not permitted by most state
courts, is generally permitted by the federal courts, but had not been directly
passed upon by the Supreme Court before the recent case of Sorrells v. United
States.2 The court in the instant case invoked the implication of that case to the
effect that the defense of "entrapment" is not available to one who has been led
' Two further ,factors are involved in this latter situation, however: (I) that a witness
should not be allowed to impeach his own verdict, and (2) that the parol evidence rule is
applicable to verdicts as well as other writings. See 5 WIGMORE, loc. cit. supra note 4;
HUGHES, op. cit. supra note 4, 302-6.
7 Relations between attorney and client are privileged until there is a showing that legal
advice was sought to serve in the perpetration of a fraud. Re Postlewaite, L. R. 35 Ch. Div.
Equally the deliberations of grand jurors are privileged but the testimony
722, 724 (1887).
of a grand juror is admitted before a petit jury to impeach the credibility of a witness when
testifying before the latter. Izer v. State, 77 Md. 110, 26 Atl. 282 (1893).
S There was enough evidence of concealment and mistatement to sustain the trial court's
judgment without the testimony as to what occurred in the jury room.
'As to the function of a judge in the decision of such preliminary questions see: Maguire and Epstein, Preliminary Questiono of Fact in Determining the Admissibility of Evidence (1926) 4o HARv. L. REV. 392, 397, 403; Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury (1929)
43 HARv. L. REv. 165; Maguire and Epstein, Rules of Evideice in Preliminary Cottroversies
as to Admissibility (1927) 36 YALE L. J. n1oI.

States v. Lynch, 256 Fed. 983 (S. D. N. Y. 1919) ; Newman v. United States,
Fed. 128, 131 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924) ; Capuano v. United States, 9 F. (2d) 41 (C. C. A.
Ist, 1925) ; Sorrells v. United States, 53 Sup. Ct. 210, 215 (1932) ; Comments (1929) 2 S.
CA. L. REV. 283, 287; Note (I93O) 44 HARv. L. REv. log.
I Supra note I. That the Sorrells case is the Supreme Court's first adjudication of the
defense of "entrapment" is recognized by the court in the Sorrells case at 213. See also
2United
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(I933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 848; (1933) 13 B. U. L. REv. 293.
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merely to furnish a specific instance of a course of habitual criminal conduct. 3
Although it is generally conceded that defendants who pled "entrapment" have
committed the acts designated as criminal, 4 the courts will either read this defense
into the statute 5 or, as has been suggested, will refuse to lend the aid of their
processes to what they deem an unconscionable prosecution. 6 Since the defense
is properly admissible for the protection of the "hitherto innocent" it seems reasonable to restrict its use to that class and to refuse it to habitual wrongdoers.
It has been urged that the court should be so shocked by the conduct of the prosecuting officer that it should not lend its aid to prosecution and should treat an
inquiry into defendant's past conduct as improper.7 This contention was rejected
by the majority in the Sorrellscase; the conflict on this point substantially reflecting the opinion of the same court on the question of illegally obtained evidence.8
While it is true that in the instant case it is not shown that the defendant had
previously committed a federal offense, a realistic view of this defense would
demand a disregard of the technical differences of identity between the sovereigns
sinned against. The refusal of the court in the instant case to permit the defense
to be available to one who had previously engaged in similarly reprehensible conduct which, although it did not constitute an offense against the federal government, was an offense against another sovereign, the state,' is deserving of commendation.1"

SSorrells v. United States, supra note I, at 216; cf. Butts v. United States, 273 Fed. 35,
37 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921) ; Simmons v. United States, 3oo Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924) ; Cornments (1929) 2 S. CAL. L. REv. 283, at 29o; Note (193o) 44 -A1v. L. Rxv. lo9, at i12.
'Note (1928) 28 CoT. L. REv. io67, io68. See the opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts in
Sorrells v. United States, supra note I at 218. It is noticeable that the decisions speak of
defendant's "commission of the crime" and yet ponder upon the problem of whether prosecution is proper.
I This was the procedure adopted by the court in Sorrells v. United States, supra note 1.
Cf. United States v. Whittier, 5 Dill. 35, Fed. Cas. No. 16,688 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1878);
United States v. Adams, 59 Fed. 674 (D. Ore. 1894).
The dissenting justices in the Sorrells case at 218 deny the propriety of reading the
defense into the statute. They would, however, have the courts refuse to open their doors to
the trial of crimes instigated by the government's own agents. This would appear to be less
objectionable than the view taken by the majority of the court, that the defense should be
read into the statute, since it savors less of a strained judicial construction of the statute than
of the creation of rules of court.
I This position was urged by the minority in the Sorrells case.
' See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 469, 471, 48 Sup. Ct. 564, 570, 575 (1928).
"The issue in that case between greater facility in convicting criminals on the one hand and
the loss of respect for a government which comes into court with unclean hands on th!
other, clearly set out in the . . . dissenting opinions, is fundamentally the issue here [in
the Sorrells case]." (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1249, 1252; cf. Casey v. United States, 276 U. S.
413, 48 Sup. Ct. 373. In the words of Mr. Justice Holmes' dissent in the Olmstead case:
"We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape
than that the Government should play an ignoble part." 277 U. S. at 470, 48 Sup. Ct. at 575.
0 N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) §§ 1141-1143. The fact that defendant's traffic in these materials was criminal, at least insofar as the state was concerned, would seem to distinguish
this case from that of United States v. Eman Manufacturing Co., 271 Fed. 353 (D. Colo.
192o) where the offense charged consisted of defendant's initial shipment of misbranded
medicines in interstate commerce in fulfillment of the request o.f a federal officer.
" It is recognized that the scope of "entrapment" as a defense is determined more by a
consideration of the public good than by an application of fixed legal precepts. See (1933) 46
I-ARv. L. Rmv., 848, 849. See Note (1928) 28 Co. L. REv. IO67, at lO72, where it is indicated that the scope of activities permitted a public officer in his search for law-breakers
differs in various offenses with due consideration being given to the repugnancy of the offense, the difficulty of procuring evidence, the fact that the indudement offered would not
have tempted one not already engaged in similar crimes, etc. See also BoRcIIARm, CoNVicTING THE INNOCENT:

Icie Sands

(1932)

at 357.

RECENT CASES
DIVORCE-MISTAKE OF LAW-VALIDATION OF DECREE UNDER UNCONSTI-

TUTIONAL STATUTE BY SUBSEQUENT ACTS OF PARTIES AFFECTED--In 1925, a

decree of divorce, as authorized by statute,' was entered at request of defendant
against plaintiff, his wife. In 1929, the statute was declared by the state supreme
court unconstitutional, 2 and plaintiff, more than a year later, made motion to vacate
the decree. By this time, defendant, in reliance on decree, had remarried. Held,
that plaintiff's delay and defendant's reliance validated the decree, though based
on an unconstitutional statute; that plaintiff was presumed to have known the
actual status of the law, and hence should have appealed from the illegal decree.
Jensen v. Jensen, 18 P. (2d) l16 (Colo. 1933). "
However just the result of the principal case may be, it is a paradox that an
unconstitutional statute, generally described by courts as "void", and "without

effect"," can confer, by virtue of reliance upon it, any rights or defenses otherwise
unavailable. Furthermore, if the settled maxim of the common law, that ignorance or mistake of law is no defense,4 be applied unreservedly, the husband's
reliance could not validate an unconstitutional decree, since he labored under a
mistake of law in remarrying. But although in the main the maxim may be
recognized as a necessary and supportable rule, the present situation provided an
opportunity to make a reasonable exception. It is important that the cause of
the mistake of law should always be considered. In criminal actions, and in fact
all actions by the state against an individual, reliance upon a statute or adjudication subsequently invalidated should be a good defense.5 And in civil suits, the
defendant may set up a plea of mistake of law, if the plaintiff was the cause
thereof.8 Reliance upon an unconstitutional decree of divorce presents an intermediate case.7 The difficult question arises as to how far reliance upon a representation by the state in the form of a statutory decree, invalid in character, can
affect the rights of third persons. It was perhaps a desire to avoid this intricate
problem which led the court in the principal case to term the plaintiff negligent in
resting on her right of appeal, thus backhandedly to attribute to her a constructive
knowledge of the law.8 And so, in some measure, the husband was excused, and
the wife penalized, because of mistake of law. It becomes clear that generalizations and maxims must crumble in particular situations, and that considerations
of the peculiar equities of each suit and the parties involved are paramount.'
"Colo. Laws 1925, 238.
v. Walton, 86 Colo. 1, 278 Pac. 78o (1929).
"Walton
8
Minn. Sugar Co. v. Iwesson, 91 Minn. 30, 97 N. W. 454 (1903).
'Pfiillips v. McConica, 59 Ohio I, si N. E. 445 (1898). Even foreigners are subject
to this conclusive presumption. Rex v. Esop, 7 C. & P. 456 (Eng. 1836). Belief, however
reasonable, in the atnconstitutiaoalty of a statute is no defense. United States v. Anthony,
II Blatchf. 200 (U. S. 1873). But where a specific intent is necessary for a crime, and
ignorance
of law negatives such intent, it is a good defense. Rex v. Hall, 3 C. & P. 409
(Eng.
1828).
Co. v. State, 31 Ariz. 485, 254 Pac. lo6O (1927) ; State v. Godwin, 123 N. C.
(Texas
697, 31 S. E. 221 (898);

State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 126 N. W. 454 (191o).

See Townsend v. Cowles, 31 Ala. 428 (1858); Roder v. Wright, 6 Ind. 183 (855).
"The majority of jurisdictions holds that the defendant is not thus relieved of civil liability. Norwood v. Goldsmith, 168 Ala. 224, 53 So. 84 (191o) ; Chenango Bridge Co. v.
Paige, 83 N. Y. 178 (1880).
""Whatever the law was, or is, Mrs. Jensen is presumed to have known it. This rule is
sometimes a hard one, but without it states could not exist. If Mrs. Jensen's want of knowledge or information governs here then in many cases, perhaps most, statutes of limitation
would be inoperative. Mrs. Jensen knew, almost as soon as the decree was entered, that it
had been done on Jensen's motion. Presumably she knew that, for that reason, the decree
was invalid. Presumably she knew that her timely protest would remove it." Burke, J., in
principal case, at 16.
' It must be borne in mind that reliance such as that in the principal case, to have merit,
must occur before the statute has been declared unconstitutional. The prima facie validity
of the statute, which operates to rebut the presumption of knowledge of the law, ceases at
the moment the supreme court declares the statute invalid. Woolsey v. Dodge, 6 McLean
142 (C. C. U. S. 7th, 1854) ; Titus v. Poland Coal Co., 275 Pa. 431, 119 Atl. 540 (1923).
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FUTURE INTERESTS-MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT-CONSTRUCTION OF "DURING
HER LIFE OR UNTIL SHE SHALL MARRY AGAIN" AS AFFECTED BY DTVORCE AND

REMARRIAGE-By a marriage settlement a trust was established with the hus-

band's money, the income to be paid to him for life, then to the wife, if she should
survive him, "during her life or until she shall marry again" then to the children.
The marriage was dissolved in 1916. The wife married again in 1930. The husband died in 1932. Held, that the income should go to the wife until her death
or a marriage entered into after the husband's death. In re Munro's Settlement
[1933] I Ch. 82.
Both in this country I and in England I a divorce decree does not affect
vested interests not dependent on coverture, unless by specific provision of the
decree.' The nature of the interest is to be construed without bias arising from
any thought that a divorced person probably would have been intended to take
no benefit by the settlement. The court based its construction on the relation of
the clauses. The clause vesting the interest precedes the clause providing for
divestment. From this fact the court reasoned that the divesting event intended
must be one following the vesting of the estate in enjoyment. 4 On that basis
the divesting event had not happened and the wife properly received the income.
There are said to be several methods of construction, 5 but generally they are
resolved into two: the first usually referred to as the "English Rule", in which
one seeks not the writer's intent, but the meaning of the language he has employed; the second, usually employed by American Courts, in which one seeks to
reconstruct the writer's intent to provide for a contingency he overlooked. 6 According to the former method of construction, this court is clearly correct.7
American courts would probably have reached a different result, by using the
second method and searching for the intent. The thought that the settlor would
have desired to benefit the wife only so long as she was not someone else's wife
(which is indicated by the very existence of this clause) added to the presence
of a child claiming as remainderman would have decided the issue for almost
any American court contra the instant holding. The court after announcing its
result hastened to support the finding by presenting supposititious cases 8 in
which an innocent party would be forced into a life of single blessedness following divorce in order to retain a life estate. This was unnecessary and, since the
cases presented scarcely indicated hardship, weakened an otherwise strong decision, which is in exact accord with the normal methods of construction by English
courts.
'Hinds v. Hinds, 7 Mackey 85 (D. C. 1888) ; Stultz v. Stultz, io7 Ind. 400 (1886) ; Fox v.
Davis, 113 Mass. 255 (1873) ; Butlar v. Butlar, 67 N. J. Eq. 136, 56 Atl. 722 (1904) ; Galusha
v. Galusha, 116 N. Y. 635, 22 N. E. 1114 (1889) ; Muhr's Estate, 59 Pa. Super. 386 (1915).
'Fitzgerald v. Chapman, I Ch. D. 563 (Eng. 1875). See also BisiloP, MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE (6th ed. 1881) 717; HIL, TRusTEEs (4th Am. ed. 1867) 671; LONG, DOMESTIC
RELATIONS (3d ed. 1923) 206; 2 SCHOU-aR, MARRIAGE, DIvoRcE, SEPAR-ATION AND DOMESTIC
RELATIONS
(6th ed. 1921) §§ 1942, 1943.
3
This can be done in England under 20 & 21 VIcr. c. 85 § 45, and in a few of the Ameri-

can states.
'Instant

case at 68.

It is interesting to note that the opposite result could have been

reached by disregarding the juxtaposition of the clauses and construing the literal meaning

of the divesting clause only. This would bring this case in line with the cases where forfeiture depends on alienation or bankruptcy (see In re Muggeridge's Trusts, Johns 625
(Eng. 186o) ; but those cases are in a separate category since Iv re Chapman, [1904] I Ch.

431.

'Holmes, The Theory of Interpretation (1898) 12 HARV. L. REv. 417; TRAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE (1898) 412, 480; 5 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) 2458.

'Brown, Problems of Construction Arising in the Law of Property-Particularlyin the

Law of Future Interests (1930) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 385.
'This is the method normally used by the courts of England.
note 6.
' Instant case pp. 88, 89.

See Brown, op. cit. supra

RECENT CASES
INSURANCE-BANKRUPTCY-MORAL OBLIGATION AS INSURABLE INTER,EST-After deceased's discharge in bankruptcy, defendant took out policies of

insurance on his life, although defendant's claim was among those proved in the
bankruptcy proceedings. Held, that deceased's moral obligation to pay defendant's claim, notwithstanding his discharge in bankruptcy, was sufficient to give
the defendant an insurable interest in his life. Livesay v. First Nat'l Bank, 57
S. W. (2d) 86 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
Though it is not easy to define what will, in all cases, constitute an insurable
interest,' it may be stated, generally, to be such an interest, arising from the rela3
2
tions of the party obtaining the insurance, either as creditor of or as surety

for the insured, or from ties of blood 4 or marriage 5 to him, as will justify a
reasonable expectation of advantage or benefit from the continuance of his life.0
In order that one may have an insurable interest as creditor, there must be a
real debt existing; 7 it may be contingent, restricted as to time, or indeterminate
in amount, but it must be actual, such as will reasonably justify a well-grounded
expectation of advantage, dependent on the life insured, so that the purpose of the
person effecting the insurance may be to secure that advantage, and not merely
to put a wager on human life." It has been held, however, that a debt to which
the bar of the statute of limitations might be applied is sufficient to vest in a creditor an insurable interest in the life of his debtor, 9 and it was on these cases that
the instant court relied. The rule as generally stated, however, is that a mere
moral claim is not sufficient to support an insurable interest as creditor,"° and,
although some courts have made exceptions in similar cases," it seems that that

'See Loomis v. Eagle Life & Health Ins. Co., 6 Gray 396, 399 (Mass. 1856), where
Chief Justice Shaw recognized this difficulty. See also Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775,
779 (1881) ; i BiDDL, INSURANCE (1893) § 187.
)
' Crotty v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 144 U. S. 621, 12 Sup. Ct. 749 (i89 ; Delaney v.
Delaney, 175 Ill. 187, 51 N. E. 961 (i898) ; Reed v. Provident Say. Life Ass. Society, 190
N. Y. iiI, 82 N. E. 734 (i9o7) ; Ulrich v. Reinoehl, I43 Pa. 238, 22 Atl. 862 (189).
'Embry's Adm'rs v. Harris, IO7 Ky. 6I, 52 S. W. 958 (899) ; Scott v. Dickson, io8 Pa.
6 (1884) ; cf. Sides v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., i6 Fed. 650 (W. D. Tenn. 1883).
'Loomis v. Eagle Life & Health Ins. Co., supra note i (parent and child); Burke v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 155 Pa. 295, 26 Atl. 445 (893) (grandparent and grandchild) ; Lord v.
Dall, I2 Mass. 115 (1815) (brother and sister). Contra: Burton v. Connecticut Mut. Life
Ins. Co., u9 Ind. 207, 21 N. E. 746 (1889) (grandparent and grandchild).
'Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U5.S. 457 (1876) ; Millard v. Brayton,
177 Mass. 533, 59 N. E. 436 (igoI) ; see Knights of the Modern Maccabees v. Sharp, 163
Mich. 449, 128 N. W. 786 (igio).
I The rule is thus stated in Warnock v. Davis, supra note I, at 779.
'Taussig v. United Security Life Ins. & Trust Co., 231 Pa. i6, 79 Atl. Sio (i91). The
reasons for requiring insurable interest to support insurance policies are: (i) Policies not
founded on insurable interest are speculative or wagering contracts; (2) Where insurable
interest is lacking, the person to be benefited by the policy is interested in the death, rather
than the life, of the person insured, and such contracts are therefore incentives to crime; and
(3) there is a public policy requiring insurable interest; see i COOLEY, BRIEFS ON INsURANcE
(2d ed. 1927) 333 ff. And, if these considerations are to be given any weight, it seems clear
that there must be a real debt to constitute the insurable interest.
' See Taussig v. United Security Life Ins. & Trust Co., supra note 7.
'Rawls v. American Mut. Life Ins. Co., 27 N. Y. 282 (1863); Insurance Co. v. Dunscomb, io8 Tenn. 724, 69 S. W. 345 (iq2) ; see Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Haxtun, 129
Ill. App. 626 (igo6) ; I MAY, INSURANCE (4th ed. r9oo) § io8. These cases seem to be contrary to the considerations set .forth supra note 7.
'o Guardian Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 80 Ill. 35 (1875).
n Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Hennessy, 99 Fed. 64 (C. C. A. 5th, r9oo) (assignment for
benefit of creditors) ; Ferguson v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 32 Hun. 306 (N. Y.
1884), af'd without opinion in to2 N. Y. 647 (1886) (bankruptcy). While it might be possible to distinguish these cases from the instant one on the basis of their facts, their language
certainly covers this situation; and they seem contrary to the principles set forth supra
note 7.
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rule should have been strictly applied in this case. Granting that the deceased
debtor has a moral obligation to pay even after his discharge in bankruptcy,12
that does not seem to constitute such an expectation of advantage in the creditor
as to justify him in taking this insurance; his claim was dependent upon the
generosity of the bankrupt, and, until there has been a new promise which would
waive the bar of the discharge in bankruptcy, it is unreasonable to hold such a
hypothetical claim to constitute an insurable interest.

RESTRAINT OF TRADE-SHERMAN

ANTI-TRuST AcT-LEGALITY OF EX-

CLUSIVE SELLING AGENCY FOR THE MARKETING OF BITUMINOUS

COAL-One

hundred and thirty-seven producers of bituminous coal in the Appalachian territory, controlling 73 per cent. of the commercial output and 54 per cent. of the total
output of the region, formed a corporation to serve as their exclusive agent in
the selling and marketing of their product. The producers owned its entire
capital stock, which was apportioned among them according to their productive
capacity. The agency was to fix the price at which the coal was to be sold, and
orders were to be prorated among the members. No member could sell outside
the agency. It was found that the agency would eliminate competition among
the members; that it would fix prices among the members; and, while it could
not effect a monopoly or "fix" market prices, that it could affect prices in all
markets.' Held, that the combination did not violate the Sherman Act, but that
the court retain jurisdiction in case of future abuses. Appalachian Coals, Inc.
et al. v. United States, 53 Sup. Ct. 471 (1933).

The principal case marks an important step toward a more enlightened interpretation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act and its relation to present-day business
conditions. 2 It has been the settled policy of the court to look upon all combinations tending toward the restraint of trade, whether honest or dishonest in their
purpose,2 as violative of the spirit and letter of the Sherman Act.4 The "rule
of reason" propounded by Mr. Chief Justice White more than twenty years ago
has been more a shibboleth than a guide in defining the policy of the court in

IZavelo v. Reeves,

227 U.

S. 625, 33 Sup. Ct. 365 (1913).

'A three-judge court for the western district of Virginia enjoined the producers from
selling their coal through the defendant agency. Parker, J., in granting the injunction,
wrote: "We sympathize with the plight of those engaged in the coal industry, whether as
operators or as miners; but we have no option but to declare the law as we find it. We cannot repeal acts of Congress nor can we overrule decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting
them." See instant case, I Fed. Supp. 339, at 349 (1932). See Comment (932) 42 YALE
L. J. 233; Comment (1933) 27 ILL. L. RE~v. 671; (1932)

I GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 151, for

various aspects of the decision by the district court in the instant case. See Donovan, Trusts
Within the Law (1932) 61 WOffD's WORK 52, for an early discussion of the combination
here involved.
' For excellent analyses of the problems raised by the Court's interpretations of the
Anti-Trust Act, see Dickinson, The Anti-Trust Laws and the Self-Regulation of Industry
(1932) 8 A. B. A. J. 6oo; Jaffee and Tobriner, Legality of Price-FixingAgreements (1932)
45 H v. L. REv. 1164; Oliphant, Trade Associations and the Law (1926) 26 Co. L. REv.
80 U. oF PA. L. REV.
381. See also, Note (1932) 32 CoL. L. REV. 291; Legislation (932)
730. In Continental Wall Paper Mfg. Co. v. Voight & Sons, 212 U. S. 227, 29 Sup. Ct. 280
(19o9) the court clearly established the illegal stats of the selling agency device.
' United States v. Hollis, 246 Fed. 611 (D. Minn. 1917) ; United States v. Reading Co.,
253 U. S. 26, 40 Sup. Ct. 425 (192o) ; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392,
47 Sup. Ct. 377 (1927).

'Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 31 Sup. Ct. 502 (1911) ; American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. io6, 31 Sup. Ct. 632 (1911); Handler, Industrial
Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws (1932) 32 CoL.. L. RLv. 179; Raymond, Standard Oil and
Tobacco Cases (912)

25 HAIv. L. REv. 31.

RECENT CASES

anti-trust matters.' This subservience to the letter of the Act has brought forth
criticism, no less striking for its eminence than for its quantity, which has become
increasingly sharp since the beginning of the present depression in industry.'
The Court has determined that combinations resulting from normal corporate
consolidation which eliminate competition only incidental to their normal organization, but which do not aim at monopoly control, are not to be condemned.7
But agreements between independent dealers, the purpose or effect of which is
to eliminate competition among themselves and fix common selling prices, are
held to be unreasonable restraints of trade.8 In other words, by the "rule of
reason," mere size of, or unexerted power in, a corporation is not condemnatory,
but agreements or combinations which have a tendency to unduly restrict competition are violations of the Act. Several decisions a few years ago suggested
a lightening of the restrictions imposed on co-operative activities,) but subsequent
developments have discounted their significance.' 0 It was reiterated that no
sanction would be given to attempts at concerted action with respect to prices or
production."
In casting aside these well-settled precedents, the Court, in the
principal case, was guided chiefly by the deplorable state of the bituminous coal
industry, which has been caused mainly by excessive productive capacity and
See Dickinson, loc. cit. mpra note

2.

See generally, HANDLER, THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAws-A SYmposium (1932);
Bell, Rule of Unreasonin Restraint of Trade Cases (1926) 12 VA. L. Rzv. 129. A great deal
of the literature has been directed toward legislative modification of the Sherman Act. See
Rhoads, Proposed Changes in the Sherman Anti-Trust Act: Their Necessity and Validity
(1931) 79 U. oF PA. L. Rzv. 6o; Probst, Failurdof the Sherman Anti-Trust Law (1926)
75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 122; Hamilton, The Problem of Trust Reform (1932) 32 COL. L. REV.
173; Comment (1933) 27 IL". L. RPv. 671; Legislation (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 730.

For analyses of attempts by states to regulate prices and production of commodities vital to
their economic existence, see Kern, State Sanctioned Trade Restraints (1933) 19 A. B. A. J.
211; Legislation (1932) 8o U. OF PA. L. REV. 436.
'United States v. U. S. Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 40 Sup. Ct. 293 (1920)

(5o% control

of the steel industry) ; United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693, 47 Sup.
Ct. 748 (1927) (dominating the farm machine industry) ; United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U. S. 32, 38 Sup. Ct. 473 (19IS) (95% control of the shoe machine manufacturing industry); see FL-TER, MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY (I931)

DUSTRIAL COMBImATIONS AND PUBuC PoucY (1927) 258.

362; WATKINs, IN-

8

United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371, 43 Sup. Ct. 607 (1923)
(combination of manufacturers of linseed oil for the exchange of price schedules and business information); United States v. American Column & Lumber Co., 257 U. S. 377, 42 Sup.
Ct. 114 (1921) (an association of manufacturers of hardwood which gathered and disseminated trade statistics among its members and published suggested prices) ; United States v.
Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 125 U. S. 211, 20 Sup. Ct. 96 (1899)

(an agreement between

six manufacturers of pipe not to bid against each other) ; United States v. Union Pacific
R. R., 226 U. S. 61, 33 Sup. Ct. 53 (1912) (purchase of controlling interest in the shares
of a competing railroad) ; Chesapeake & Ohio Fuel Co. v. United States, 115 Fed. 61o (C. C.
A. 6th, i9o2) (an agreement between 14 coal-producing companies to sell through an exclusive selling agency at a uniform price [strikingly similar to the principal case]) ; Poultry
Dealers Association v. United States, 4 F. (2d) 840 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) (combination of
more than 5o% of the poultry buyers in New York City for the establishment of daily
prices).
'Maple Flooring Association v. United States, 268 U. S. 563, 45 Sup. Ct. 578 (1925);
Cement Manufacturers Association v. United States, 268 U. S. 588, 45 Sup. Ct. 586 (925).
But in the Maple case the court said that the gathering and dissemination of trade information relating to the cost and volume of production, previous selling prices and stocks on hand,
were legal only if such information was exchanged "without

. . . reaching

.

. . any

agreement or any concerted action with respect to prices or production". See supra at 586,
45 Sup. Ct. at 586. See also, United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., supra note 3, at 400, 47
Sup. Ct. at 380; Donovan, The Legality of Trade Associations (1926) II AcAD. OF POL. Sci.
PRoc. 571.

"Federal Trade Commission v. Pacific States Paper Trade Association, 273 U. S. 52,
47 Sup. Ct. 255 (1927) ; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., supra note 3.
"See HANDLER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 93; Note (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 291.
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unrestricted competition. 2 The decision of the court, cautiously worded,1
denotes sanction of concerted action which will have a tendency to stabilize market
prices of a distressed product and to raise such prices to a level higher than would
otherwise obtain. If such action will lead to undue restraint on competition,
the court reserved authority to enjoin its continuance.14 Only future adjudications will adequately define the magnitude of this holding. Meanwhile, a decisive
step forward has been taken.

TRUSTS--DIcRETIONARY TRUST-INTERFERENCE BY THE COURT WHERE

THERE IS AN "ABUsE OF DlscRETIN"-Plaintiff was beneficiary of a testamentary trust which instructed the trustees to use the principal (of $IOOO) and the
income "entirely as they deem best for her". Plaintiff was required to undergo
an expensive operation. Her husband was physically unable to work and consequently unable to pay for it. Plaintiff applied to the trustees for sufficient money
to pay for medical expenses. The request was refused beyond giving her one
year's interest. Plaintiff, while in the hospital, filed a bill praying that trustees
be required to apply enough of the fund to defray the necessary medical expenses.
Held, that the refusal to pay for medical expenses was an abuse of discretion
which, if permitted, would defeat the settlor's intention. Rinker's Adm'r et al. v.
Simpson, 166 S. E. 546 (Va., 1932).
Generally, courts of equity will not interfere to control the judgment of
a trustee under a discretionary trust,' unless there is what the courts call an
"abuse of discretion". 2 Obviously, no general rule can be laid down to determine when such an abuse exists.3 There are, however, certain rather well-settled4
situations in which the court will interfere, as where the trustee acts dishonstly,
or from an improper motive." Also, the court will interfere where the exercise

'See LAnEDRI, CONCENTRATION iN AmFmCAx INDUSTRY (1931) 67; RocHEsTER, LABoR
AND COAL (1930) 50; see also opinion of instant case for an exposition of the demoralized
state of the industry.
' See instant case at 478, 479.
" The agency had not yet been in operation when the case was tried.

'York v. Maryland Trust Co., 149 Md. 6o8, 131 Atl. 829 (1926); TRUSTS RESTATEMENT
(Am. L. Inst. 1932) § 181.
'Martin v. McCune, 318 Ill. 585, 149 N. E. 489 (1925) ; Stein v. Safe Deposit & Trust
Company of Baltimore, 127 Md. 2o6, 96 Atl. 349 (1915) ; Carter v. Young, 193 N. C. 678,
137 S. E. 875 (1927). The cases contain many statements to the effect that it is not possible
to give a trustee such discretion as will place him beyond the control of a court of equity:
McDonald v. McDonald, 92 Ala. 537, 9 So. 195 (89o) ; Cromie v. Bull, 81 Ky. 646 (1884) ;
Haydel v. Hurck, 5 Mo. App. 267 (1878) ; Jones v. Jones, 8 Misc. 66o, 3o N. Y. Supp. 177
(0894).
'The TRUSTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1932) § 181 (d) suggests the following factors to be used in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion (at p. 12) : "( i) the extent of the discretion intended to be conferred upon the trustee by the terms of the trust;
(2) the purpose of the trust; (3) the nature of the power; (4) the existence or non-existence, the definiteness or indefiniteness, of an external standard by which the reasonableness
of the trustee's conduct can be judged; (5) the motives of the trustee in exercising or refraining from exercising the power; (6) the existence or non-existence of an interest in the
trustee conflicting with that of the beneficiaries."
'In re Smith, [1896] i Ch. 71 (trustee held liable for loss caused by an investment
which he accepted a bribe to make, he being vested with discretion as to investments); see
Turnure v. Turnure, 89 N. J. Eq. 197, 200, lO4 Atl. 293, 294 (1918).
Colton v. Colton, 127 U. S. 300, 8 Sup. Ct. 1164 (1888) (trustee, who was remainderman, was directed to provide for beneficiary as "in her judgment will be best". The court
compelled the trustee to provide for support) ; McDonald v. McDonald, supra note 2 (trust
for support of the trustee and others, payments to be made in his discretion. He applied all
the income to his own use and that of two beneficiaries and refused to provide for the others.
The court compelled him to provide for all the beneficiaries).
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of judgment is left to the trustee and he fails to use his judgment. 6 If there
is some standard provided by the will that will serve to test the reasonableness
of the trustee's discretion, then the court will interfere if the exercise goes
beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment. 7 On the other hand, it has been
held that the court would not interfere, so long as the trustee acts honestly, where
the terms of the trust dispense with any requirement of reasonableness in the
exercise of the trustee's discretion.8 Furthermore, the courts will not permit the
trustee to exercise his judgment in any way which will tend to defeat the settlor's
intention. 9 In the principal case there was no evidence of dishonesty or improper
motive, nor any failure to exercise judgment. Nor did the will provide any
standard whereby the reasonableness of the trustee's exercise of discretion can be
tested, so that none of these reasons can be given for the interference of the court.
On the other hand, there is no such provision for uncontrolled discretion as might
prevent the court's interference in the absence of dishonesty. However, the dire
need of the beneficiary, the serious necessity for medical services, and the obvious
intention of the settlor to provide for her as far as both the principal and interest
of the fund would permit, seem to justify the intervention of the court.

TRUSTS-SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS-CLAIM OF TOWN FOR COSTS OF MAIN-

TAINING BENEFICIARY IN JAIL-Beneficiary of spendthrift trust was committed

to the county jail for refusal to comply with order of court for support of a
bastard child. Plaintiff town was compelled to pay cost of maintaining beneficiary in jail and now seeks repayment from the income of trust funds in the
hands of the trustee. Held, that the cost of supporting beneficiary in jail was
a proper charge upon the income of such trust in the hands of the trustee. Town
of Shrewsbury v. Bucklin, 163 Atl. 626 (Vt. 1933).
6Stephenson v. Norris, 128 Wis. 242, lo7 N. W. 343 (igo6); Wilson v. Turner, 22 Ch.
D. 521 (1883) (trustees were directed to apply income in their discretion ,for maintenance of
a child. Trustees refused to exercise their discretion and paid the income to the child's
father. The latter was held liable to repay the income).
'Russel v. Hartley, 83 Conn. 654, 78 Atl. 320 (ipIo)' (will directed trustee to pay over
so much of the principal as was necessary for the support of the beneficiary, if, in the judgment of the trustee, the income was insufficient for the purpose) ; In re Clark, 174 Iowa 449,
154 N. W. 759 (915) (trustees were directed to apply funds "as may seem best in their
judgment" to advance the interest of the beneficiary) ; Manning v. Sheehan, 75 Misc. 374,
133 N. Y. Supp. ioo6 (1911) (trust for support of the beneficiary; there was a trust fund of
$5,ooo, and the court ordered the trustee to pay $75a per year, and to pay a bill of $200 for
medical attention and groceries).
'Whittaker v. McDowell, 82 Conn. 195, 72 Atl. 938 (19o9) (where trustee was given
"absolute discretion in the manner of the disposition", and his decision was to be conclusive:
held that the court could not, after his death, appoint another trustee with powers as great) ;
Keyser v. Mitchell, 67 Pa. 473 (1871) (payments were to be at "all times at the sole and
absolute discretion of the trustee"; it was held that the court would not interfere, in an action
brought by a creditor seeking to force payments, to control the trustee's discretion) ; Tabor v.
Brooks, io Ch. D. 273 (1878) (where trustees had power to apply the income as they "in
their uncontrolled and irresponsible discretion think proper", the court refused to interfere
in the absence of proof of bad faith) ; Gisborne v. Gisborne, 2 App. Cas. 300 (1877) (where
trustees were given absolute discretion and "uncontrollable authority" it was held that, in
the absence of dishonesty, the court would not interfere).
' Murphy v. Delano, 95 Me. 229, 49 Atl. 1053 (19O) ; Rife v. Geyer, 59 Pa. 393 (1868)
(testator gave to his son the income of a trust estate for life, with an express provision
against alienation and liability for debts, and the trustee later gave the son a deed in fee
simple. This was held to be inoperative as destroying the trust and defeating the intention
of the settlor) ; Keyser v. Mitchell, supra note 8 (where income was to be expended at the
discretion of the trustee, the court said that to subject the income to execution at the suit of
a creditor would end the trustee's discretion and defeat the settlor's intention, the court refusing to control the trustee's discretion) ; (1929) 28 MicH. L. R .217.
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Spendthrift trusts, where recognized and enforced,1 were originally immune
from the claims of all creditors of the beneficiary. 2 as long as the trust funds
were in the possession of the trustee. The creditor was required to seek his
remedy against the beneficiary directly, and satisfaction might be had only by
ascertaining the date of payment of income to the beneficiary and then issuing
execution before the beneficiary had an opportunity of disposing of the money
received. This rule has, in some states, been modified by statutes permitting the
attachment of income accrued in the hands of the trustee. 4 In the absence of a
statute the entire income is still exempt. 5 Under the general rule, however,
the maintenance of a lunatic beneficiary in a state institution was held to be a
charge upon the trust funds in favor of the state,6 or a subdivision thereof,7
which was liable for such expense. In these cases, the beneficiary had been in
the asylum prior to the death of the settlor and this fact was seized upon to show
that the settlor intended the beneficiary's support in the state institution to be
within the purpose of the trust.8 In the instant case the court found that
the plaintiff's claim was within the intention of the settlor since the trust in terms
provided for the support of the beneficiary. It is rather difficult to see by what
theory support in a public institution is within the settlor's intention whereas support by a private individual falls without the pale of his intention. 9 The real
ground of these decisions seems to be protection of public funds from use for private purposes on the basis that state support of one who has financial ability tosupport himself is not a public duty. Another very interesting problem would have
been presented to the court if the suit had been to recover the cost of supporting
the bastard child of the beneficiary. A wife who has been deserted by the beneficiary is entitled to charge the trust funds for her support and the support of the
infant child of the beneficiary on the theory that the settlor intended the benefits of
the trust to extend to the family of the beneficiary."0 Although the support of the
'Spendthrift trusts are not "erforceable in England nor in a minority of the American
states. See (1932) 8o U. OF PA. L. REv. 465.
'A debtor may not create a spendthrift trust naming himself as beneficiary and thus
exempt his estate from the claims of creditors. McColgan v. Walter Magee, Inc., 172 Cal.
182, 155 Pac. 995 (i916). In De Rousse v. Williams, i81 Iowa 379, 164 N. W. 8o6 (917),
where the defendant accepted his interest in the spendthrift trust in relinquishment of his
right to contest his father's will it was held that this constituted such a giving up of property as to give creditors an interest in the trust.
3
This rule included income accrued in the hands of the trustee and payable to the beneficiary. Congress Hotel v. Martin, 312 Ill. 318, 143 N. E. 838 (924) ; Cromwell v. Converse, io8 Conn. 412, 143 Atl. 413 (1928).
' Such statutes are discussed in Runk, Modification. of the Rule Against Perpetuities
(1932) 8o U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 397, 405; see also Griswold, The Beneficiary of a Spendthrift
Trust (1929) 43 HARV. L. REv. 63, 87.
Congress Hotel v. Martin, supra note 3.
6Walter's Case, 278 Pa. 42I, i23 At. 408 (924).
Recovery is possible only for support rendered after the creation of the trust. Id., at 425, 823 Atl. at 409; Board of Freeholders v. Henry, 41 N. J. Eq. 388, 4 Atl. 858 (1886).
'In re Hohenshieldt's Estate, 105 Pa. Super. I8, I59 Atl. 71 (1932).
' In Walter's Case, supra note 6, at 424, 823 At. at 409, the court said, "The trust, in
the present instance was intended to secure the comfort of the insane person; and the devotion of the income, or a part of the principal, to the satisfaction of obligations, incurred on
his behalf, is the mere carrying out of the testatrix's directions."
'Where an ordinary creditor supplies the beneficiary with necessaries, the cases are
unsettled as to the right of such creditor to charge the trust fund for the amount of his
claim. For a discussion of cases on this point, see Griswold, upra note 4, at 79.
"England v. England, 223 Ill. App. 549 (1922); Gardner v. O'Loughlin, 76 N. H. 481,
84 At. 935 (1912); Moorehead's Estate, 289 Pa. 542, 137 Atl. 8o2 (1927); cf. Board of
Charities v. Lochard, I98 Pa. 572, 48 Atl. 496 (igoi) where the will provided that "all
moneys . . . are to be paid to the legatees in person, and to no one else". Pennsylvania
by statute now provides that the wife and children may attach 5o% of the beneficiary's inter-
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beneficiary's illegitimate children cannot be said to have been within the contemplation of the settlor, it would seem that a strong public policy favors the
subjection of the trust income to such purpose, since a contrary result would
throw the hapless offspring upon the bounty of the state.

or DECEDENT AS A CHARGE UPON
FuND--Decedent opened a savings account in her name "in trust for" petitioner. There was no delivery of the pass book nor notice to the beneficiary. Six
drafts were drawn against the account in her lifetime. Petitioner sues administrator to compel surrender of the pass book. Held, that in so far as the general
assets of decedent's estate were insufficient to pay the creditors and reasonable
funeral and administration expenses, these obligations were a charge against the
savings account. In re ReicWs Estate, 262 N. Y. Supp. 623 (1933).
Since the decision of Matter of Totten, the New York courts have consistently held 2 that a deposit of money by a person in his own name in trust for
another establishes a tentative trust, and if the depositor predeceases the beneficiary without revoking the trust, a presumption arises that an absolute trust was
created as to the balance on hand at the death of the depositor.3 The qualifying
word "tentative" suggests that such a trust is a departure from the traditional
requisites of the ordinary trust, and this becomes evident when it is realized that
during the lifetime of the depositor he has absolute control 4 of the money. No
trust was created in the lifetime of the depositor because the res, being the amount
in the account upon the death of the depositor, is uncertain until his death; nor
was a trust intended to be created upon the death of the depositor, because at
that time he intended both legal and equitable title to pass to the beneficiary.
The tentative trust theory is obviously a device for circumventing the requirements of the statute of wills.' The bank account is generally small in
amount, and the court recognizes the lack of necessity for probating such instruments and also the unlikelihood of fraud in the bank deposit situation." A
TRUSTS-TENTATIVE TRUsT-DEBTS

THE

est in satisfaction of a judgment for support. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § 243.
Missouri has a similar statute, except that no limitation is placed upon the amount of income
which may be reached; it also permits the wife to reach such funds. in satisfaction of a decree for alimony. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 569. At common law a divorce decree, terminating the marriage relation also terminated the right of the wife to obtain support from the
trust fund since the wife was then regarded as an ordinary creditor, Eaton v. Eaton, 81 N.
H. 275, 125 AtI. 433 (1924) ; but a divorce does not affect the right of the beneficiary's minor
child since the latter still remains a member of the beneficiary's family.
1179

N. Y.

L. REv.
70.
2

112,

71 N. E. 748 (19o4) ; Note (1904) 4 CoL. L. REv.

5o2; (19o4)

i HAgv.

Hemmerich v. Union Dime Savings Inst., 205 N. Y. 366, 98 N. E. 499 (1912) ; In re
Iive's Estate, 139 Misc. 273, 248 N. Y. Supp. 677 (93)
; In re Schiffer's Estate, 142 Misc.
548, 254 N. Y. Supp. 871 (1931).
'The doctrine of Matter of Totten has been tentatively adopted by the American Law
Institute. TRUSTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1930) § 65. In Woodward's Estate, 14 D.
& C. 363 (Pa. 193o) the court followed Gaffney's Estate, 146 Pa. 49, 23 Atl. 163 (1892) and
held that upon death of the depositor, the named beneficiary was prima fade entitled to the
deposit. For the rule in other jurisdictions, see Scott, Trusts and the Statute of Wills
(1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 521, 540; Note (1933) 81 U. Or PA. L. REv. 737.
'See Larremore, JudicialLegislation in New York (1905) 14 YALE L. J. 312, 315; cf.
Scott, loc. cit. supranote 3.
rNicklas v. Parker, 69 N. J. Eq. 743, 61 AtI. 267 (9o5).
See also Leaphart, The Trust
as a Substitute for a Will (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 626, 635.
"In addition, the tentative trust effectuates the dispositive intention of the depositor. Evidence is of course admissible to show that no trust was ever intended, Matter of Barefield,
177 N. Y. 387, 69 N. E. 732 (19o4) ; or that the declaration of trust was made for the pur-
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recognition of the true nature of the tentative trust as being a testamentary disposition sanctioned by the courts and not requiring special formality leads to
the conclusion that the trust analogy should not be carried to further inaccuracy.
It is not necessary to apply traditional trust theory when the question arises
whether this devise is subject to an inheritance tax 7 or to the debts S of the
decedent. It seems sensible to recognize the actual character of the transaction in
these cases and treat the account as though it had been a devise properly executed
and effective as of the time of the death of the depositor. The instant case
candidly concedes the tentative trust to be a judicial vehicle added to the statutorily authorized methods for testamentary disposition of property, and allows
the debts of decedent to be a charge upon the fund before it is paid over to the
named beneficiary. Strict interpretation of the rule of Matter of Totte' without unnecessary and illogical extension will encourage its adoption by other
jurisdictions.
pose of evading by-law provisions of the savings institution. Brabrook v. Boston Five Cent
Savings Bank, 1o4 Mass. 228 (1870). A subsequent will, inconsistent with the trust, has
been held to be revocatory. In re Murray's Estate, 256 N. Y. Supp. 815 (1932) ; Note (1932)

42

YALE

L. J. 141.

"It is generally held that the funds of a revocable trust are taxable since the transfer
is to vest in enjoyment upon death of the depositor. In re Fulham's Estate, 96 Vt. 308, 119
Atl. 433 (1923); cf. Stimson, When Revocable Trusts Are Subject to Inheritawe Tax
(1927) 25 MIcH. L. REv. 839.
8
The court in the instant case followed the case of Beakes Dairy Co. v. Berns, 128 App.
Div. 137, 112 N, Y. Supp. 52 9 (19o8) in holding the fund subject to decedent's debts. In
charging the fund with funeral expenses, the court reasoned that the presumption of absolute
trust is merely a ,factual inference, overcome by the stronger inference arising from the "customary inclinations of mankind" that normal human beings intend to reserve enough money
for decent burial, and therefore the trust fund was limited to the amount remaining after
payment of funeral expenses. This devious process of reasoning is unnecessary if the fund
is recognized as a testamentary transfer.
'In accord with Matter of Totten, see Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212, 43 Atl. 43
(1899) ; Dyste v. Farmers' & Mech. Bk., 179 Minn. 430, 229 N. W. 865 (193o) ; cf. Kuck v.
Raftery, H7 Cal. App. 755, 4 P. (2d) 552 (i3i).

